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THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC MARKETS
Opting for a 'market economy' does not in itself answer the question as
to the precise institutional form this economic order will take and the roles that
will be played by the various public and private actors. Within some
yet-to-be-determined limits, there is a range of market economies that will differ
in their specific features, depending upon the particular regulatory context
defining the relation between market activity, on the one hand, and the set of
overarching societal objectives which specify the limits under which this
economic activity is to take place, on the other hand. If economic regulation is
not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, the way out of an overly
regulated-regimented and planned economy into some form of a 'market
economy' does not necessarily require the denial of an active role for
government, both in creating the institutional prerequisites for, and at the same
time providing the societally determined normative constraints upon, the free
play of these market forces. These regulatory measures define the particular
political economy of the social market of a given country.
Viewed from this general perspective, the economic transition presently
under way in the countries of central Europe can be analyzed in terms of the
interaction between two inter-related processes, First of all, economic activity is
being released from the confines of the socialist economic system and exposed
to the dynamic forces of the market. At the same time, this emerging market
system will need to be subjected to new constraints intended to ensure that
economic activity also respects and promotes certain overarching social values
not necessarily 'protected' by market-driven economic decision making. For
example, in Western Europe notions of sustainable development and ecological
modernization, which view the relationship between environmental quality and
economic development in positive-sum terms, are being used to redefine the
social context and overarching policy objectives for market-oriented economic
activity. Here preventive environmental policy becomes a fundamental
precondition for effective economic reform and long-term development. At the
same time, it is one of the societal constraints that defines what kind of
economic activity will be permitted.
A serious commitment to the goal of sustainable development would
mean that economic reform and market activity cannot be allowed to threaten or
to ignore environmental policy objectives. Consequently, any general
restructuring of the previously centrally planned economy would, according to
this line of reasoning, require the effective institutionalization of an appropriate
balance between governmental intervention and the free play of market forces
to promote sustainable societal development. According to this scenario, the
normative orientation for the new 'social market' is provided by the goal of
ecological modernization as both the basis for and an expression of integration
of economic development and environmental quality policy objectives. The
restructuring of these economies must be carried out in such a way as to
contribute both to cleaning up the environmental damage from socialist system
and developing integrated preventive policy programs as central elements of
strategic and operational planning at all levels of action, from the formulation of
governmental policy down to the operational management of firms.
THE RELEVANCE OF EU ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY FOR CENTRAL
EUROPE
But why should this goal of sustainable development be taken seriously
as a regulatory principle by policy makers in Central and East European
countries? While this 'meta-goal' seems to offer the philosopher’s stone for
avoiding politically unpleasant trade-offs between economic growth and
environmental quality, it would appear that these countries have other, more
pressing priorities. Are they not, understandably, more concerned with
achieving a rapid improvement of their countries' standard of living by allowing
as much room as is possible for the free play of market forces? Is not economic
development the most pressing concern in order to curb social unrest and
promote political stability? Is not environmental protection, therefore, a luxury
for which these countries cannot avoid to pay the economic price?
There are at least three sets of pressures that could work to bring about
a political commitment to the strategy of sustainable development. First of all,
the politically relevant groups in these societies could 'demand' it, with or
without support of the main economic actors. Or the political leadership itself
might become sold on the idea and attempt to convince the relevant domestic
actors of the need to integrate both the environmental preconditions and
consequences of economic activity into the country's development strategy.
Equally possible, and for our discussion most interesting, is that this
commitment could be imposed upon the policy makers by the relevant
actor-system outside the country, i.e. the European Union, as the price for
participation in broader system of European economic cooperation.
For the moment it is this latter source of pressure, in the form of the
different association agreements with the EU, that is an important factor
shaping domestic policy decisions. In turn, this EU pressure works either to
reinforce already-present indigenous forces or to stimulate them to emerge to
support EU demands. To the extent that the countries of Central and East
Europe desire to gain access to the broader European market of the EU, they
will not only have to 'liberalize' their economies. They will also be required to
adhere to the constraints placed upon this economic development by other
policies of the Community, For example, in Chapter III of the Association
Agreement with the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the contracting
parties agree that "an important condition for the CSFR’s economic integration
into the Community" would be the approximation of existing and future
legislation to that of the Community. This approximation of laws would extend in
particular to, among areas, the environment. This means that existing EU policy
-in the form of various directives and regulations- must be incorporated into and
applied through national legislation or other legally binding instruments.
Furthermore, the overall thrust of Community environmental policy -most
recently laid out in the Fifth Environmental Action Program (Commission, 1992)-
will be expected to give direction to decision on environmental management
within associated countries. These obligations with regard to environmental
issues are spelled out in more detail in Article 80 of the Agreement. Not only
existing laws and regulations but also with respect to the direction to be
followed in the continuing development of national and Community
environmental policy.
Environmental protection has also been an integral part -from its
inception- of the PHARE Program of the EU which is aimed at supporting
economic reforms in Central and East Europe. In 1991 the Commission’s
environmental strategy on which the PHARE program was to be based in the
next period for this area was approved by the G-24 environmental group as well
as the environmental ministers from East and West Europe. This program
contains a number of policy objectives and priorities including raising the
environmental consciousness of the public, strengthening and expanding the
institutional, political and juridical framework for environmental policy, and
transferring knowledge and technology.
THE EMERGING POLICY STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
The EU has had its own environmental policy since 1973, the year in
which the First Environmental Action Program of the Community was approved.
Although there was no express authorization in the Treaty to do so, in the
course of the subsequent twenty years, a comprehensive set of measures has
been developed to deal with the various environmental problems confronting
the member states(1). The legal (constitutional) situation changed dramatically
in 1987 when the Single European Act (SEA) went into effect. This revision of
the Treaty of Rome, designed to create the institutional preconditions for the
completion of the internal market, granted the European Community the explicit
authority to carry out an environmental policy. Article 130R of the SEA defines
the basic objectives of this policy as the preservation, protection and
improvement of the quality of the environment; the protection of the health of
human beings; and the prudent and rational use of natural resources.
Community policy in pursuit of these objectives is to be based on the principles
of preventive action; combating pollution at the source; and the 'polluter pays'.
A second essential change in EU environmental policy as a result of the
changes introduced by the SEA was that the new article 100A explicitly names
the environment as an area with regard to which harmonization
('approximation') legislation could be introduced in adjusting the national
regulatory systems in preparation for the start of the Internal Market. The
Maastricht Treaty develops the environmental powers of the Community even
further. In particular, it has added the notion of 'sustainability' to the main
objective of the European Community, in the form of 'sustainable growth', a
model in which the demands of the environment and economy are to be in
harmony with one another.
The Community has a number of instruments at its disposal in the area
of environmental policy. The most important of these are the Environmental
Action Programs and, of course, the concrete legislative measures dealing with
environmental matters. The Action Programs are broadly conceived statements
of the objectives and principles intended to guide policy development for a
medium term period, i.e. four years. Since the First Program (1973-1975)
various action programs have dealt more concretely and in more detail with
different sub-areas of environmental policy. We will come back to these
programs below.
The most widely used legislative instrument is the directive. The reason
for this is that this instrument allows the member states the necessary room to
fit the objectives set for the Community as a whole into the specific
legal-administrative systems and the policy strategies of the different states.
The European Community is active in all the usual areas of environmental
management: water, air, soil, waste, chemicals, noise, nature conservation. In
none of these areas, however, has the Community developed a consistent
program to deal comprehensively with a given area. At the moment there are
approximately 200 EU environmental directives. Some are very specific, dealing
with a particular substance or source; others deal with more general topics. Two
types of objectives of such directives can be distinguished: these setting
specific environmental objectives, such as water quality standards or emissions
of different substances; and those defining certain common administrative
procedures to be used, such as the setting up of water quality plans or the
introduction of environmental assessment procedures (Bennett and Liefferink,
1993:43).
For the purposes of this paper, the details of the specific regulatory
programs are less important than the overall strategic concepts guiding the
development of Community policy. In particular, what is interesting for us is the
emerging redefinition of the relations between economic activity within the
Community (the promotion of which initially was and still is the primary concern
of the EU) and the management of environmental quality. In order to suggest
the way in which the notion of sustainability has come to occupy a central place
in this strategic concept, we will look a bit more closely at the more recent
Environmental Action Programs. In this way it should be possible to sketch the
kinds of demands that Community policy will be making on Member (and
Associated) States. In particular, we will be interested in the kinds of
adjustments these countries will be required to make in the way they manage
the relationships between environmental quality and economic development,
and the kinds of institutional changes that will be needed to meet these
demands.
RECONCEPTUALIZING THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMY AND
ENVIRONMENT (2)
Community policy makers have been among the main contributors to the
development of the ideology of ecological modernization (Weale and Williams,
1992:47). As we have already seen above, one of the chief tenets of this
ideology is that environmental protection should be seen not as being in
competition with economic growth and development, but instead as an essential
precondition for such growth and development. Recognition of the long-term
compatibility of these two sets of values and policy objectives developed
gradually as Community policy makers began stressing the importance of
stringent environmental standards in a period of global economic competition as
well as underlining the importance of quality of life considerations for skilled
workers. Whereas the initial action program in 1973 was primarily concerned
with the problems different national environmental regulations might cause for
the creation of a single European market (Hildebrand, 1992:25), already the
Third Program (1982-86) was informed by the conviction that resources of the
environment were the basis -and limits- to further economic and social
development and improvement of the working situation. In adopting the Third
Program, the Council explicitly recognized the benefits that environmental
protection could offer the EU in terms of greater competitiveness. This theme
was picked up and developed further in the Fourth Program (1987-1992) where
it was argued that the measures taken to protect the quality of the environment
can be expected to be an important stimulus to economic growth and will,
consequently, work to facilitate creation of employment opportunities (Weale,
1993:207). just how far the traditional growth ethos of the Community has
'greened' can be seen in the preamble to Maastricht Treaty which speaks of
"balanced and sustainable economic and social progress" as the overall
objective of the Community.
These ideas had already figured in the decisions regarding the SEA
when it was argued that the increased economic growth anticipated as a
consequence of the completion of the internal market would be unsustainable
unless environmental considerations were taken into account, no longer as a
potential limiting factor but rather as an incentive to greater efficiency and
competitiveness of European industry. As Albert Weale has pointed out, with its
reconceptualization of the relationship between the economy and the
environment, the ideology of ecological modernization marks "a decisive break"
with the assumptions of the first wave of environmental policy (Weale,
1993:207). Instead of being seen as a burden to the economy, environmental
protection is now considered to be a potential source of future growth. If a
country intends to acquire or maintain a secure position in the international
market place it will need the technical and production capability to respond to
the increasing demand for environmental quality by producing low pollution
goods and pollution control technology. Such a capability has become
necessary because in the emerging global markets, standards of product
acceptability will more and more be determined by the country with the most
stringent pollution control standards. As Weale, again, puts it: "the future
development of a post-industrial economy will depend upon (a country's) ability
to produce high value, high quality products with stringent environmental
standards enforced" (Weale, 1992:77).
This line of argument occupies a prominent place in the thinking on
which the Fourth Action Program of the EU is based. Here we read: "The
Commission is convinced that ... the future competitiveness of Community
industry on the world market will depend heavily upon its ability to offer goods
and services causing no pollution and achieving standards at least as good as
its competitors" (Commission, 1986). Consequently, the proposals of that action
program were "rooted in fact that as a key factor in economic decision making,
environmental protection policy and strict environmental protection standards
are a sine qua non for the quality of life that the citizens of the Community
expect" (Commission, 1986:3). In this sense, the ideology of ecological
modernization underlying the environmental quality management strategies of
the Community and individual member states, directly links the "prospects for
future economic development in an era of global markets with higher standards
of pollution control and environmentally safe products and processes" (Weale,
1992:77).
Although the different strands out of which this ideology has been woven
provide opportunities for different groups to give somewhat different
interpretations and set different accents regarding what measures are
specifically required, it does provide a common frame of reference or mode of
discourse for a meeting of the minds -and interests- of actors who had, under
earlier problem definitions, been on opposing sides of the debate. Ecological
modernization suggests a way of finding win-win solutions to problems of
integrating or balancing economic rationality and environmental quality. It
provides a legitimizing device for public policy debate and development, and
can potentially serve, as well, as an important source of policy ideas and
principles. In this way it can be used to define new strategies of action which
call new actors onto the political scene thereby laying the basis for the formation
of new policy coalition (3).
Equally important for the argument being presented in this paper is that
this redefinition of the relationship between economic competitiveness and
environmental regulation is coupled with a view about the role to be played by
government in creating the conditions for realizing these economic
development. It is not expected that the potential of ecological modernization
will be realized by processes of spontaneous adjustment in response to moral
imperatives or market forces. Public intervention (regulation) will be essential for
ensuring that the relation between industry and the environment as posited by
the notion of ecological modernization in fact comes about. There is, therefore,
a positive role for government to play -at both the national and the European
level- in raising standards of environmental regulation as a means to spur
industrial innovation. It is in this connection that Director General Brinkhorst has
argued that the right kind of government action, in the form of "an effective
environmental policy", will be required for "our industrial survival in many areas"
(quoted in Weale, 1992:78).
However, while government policy and regulation will continue to play an
essential role in shaping the conditions under which ecological modernization
can be achieved, it will not be a system of government intervention modeled on
traditional direct regulation. The relationships between government (public
authorities) and economic actors will also need to be adjusted to reflect the logic
underlying the ideology defining both the objectives of this policy and the means
for its achievement. The nature and role of Community environmental policy
will, in turn, reflect processes already underway in many Member States and
provide a Community-wide framework to channel further developments in this
regard.
THE FIFTH ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION PROGRAM AND THE ROAD TO
SUSTAINABILITY
The strategic line spelled out in the Fifth Action Program is seen as a
"turning point" in the environmental policy of the European Community. This
program is intended to serve as the framework for dealing with what is seen as
"one of the most important tasks of the Community in the 1990s", to whit the
"reconciliation of social-economic development with the maintenance and
protection of the environment" (Commission, 1992:19). In pursuit of this
objective, the program offers a fundamentally different approach was used than
in the other four programs. The emphasis now lies upon the actors and
activities that cause the exhaustion (exploitation) of natural resources and other
forms of disturbances in the environment, the so-called 'target groups'.
In dealing with polluting activities previous Action Programs had placed
primary emphasis on legislation or regulations. However, the instrumental
approach of the Fifth Action Program is based on the assumption that
present-day pollution trends can only be reversed by means of a restructuring of
consumption and behavior patterns and that this, in turn, requires the
involvement of all societal groupings in a joint effort, requires a broader array of
instruments. juridical (or legislative) instrument will remain an important element
in the arsenal. However, a second important instrument are the so-called
market oriented instruments. By means of these instruments, both producers
and consumers can be moved or motivated to a sustainable use of natural
resources by forcing them to calculate the external environmental costs in the
prices of the product. In this way the market itself will ensure that
environmentally-friendly goods and services will be better able to compete with
those that cause a lot of pollution and waste. Examples of such instruments are:
fiscal stimulation measures or charges; the environmental audit, the eco-label
and risk liability for environmental damage.
A third type of instrument are the so-called "horizontal supporting
instruments" such as statistical information and basic information regarding the
condition of the environment; scientific research on the development of clean
technologies; a better spatial and sectoral planning; and environmental
education. Lastly, there is a number of financial instruments through which
money is transferred from Community programs and funds (e.g., Regional
Structural Funds; the new Cohesion Fund; the PHARE Program) in support of
measures to improve environmental quality.
Underlying the policy strategy of the Fifth program is the assumption that
the general objective of sustainable development, as well as the various specific
objectives included in the program can only be achieved by means of a joint
effort of all parties in the form of 'partnership' (Brinkhorst and Klatte, 1993:73).
According to the subsidiarity principle, that has come to occupy a central place
in the political debate over the division of labor between the Community and the
Member States, the Community is only supposed to come into action whenever
and insofar as the objectives to be pursued cannot adequately be achieved by
the Member States alone, and therefore, given the nature and scope of the
problem, can better be realized by the Community. The Fifth Program, however,
links the notion of subsidiarity with the idea of partnership -or, as it is often
referred to, joint responsibility. According to Brinkhorst and Matte: "Partnership
does not so much mean a choice of the most suitable level of action to the
exclusion of other levels". Rather what is at issue is to find the most appropriate
combination of different environmental instruments and 'actors' -within the
boundaries set by the existing allocation of tasks and powers between the
Community, the Member States, regional and local authorities (Brinkhorst and
Klatte, 1993:74).
This principle of joint problem-solving is to be institutionalized along the
following lines. Traditionally, EU environmental policy has been based on an
approach relying heavily on legislation (a heavily 'top down' approach). The new
strategy is based upon the "active participation of all social-economic partners
in the joint search for solutions for environmental problems and the realization
of sustainable development (Brinkhorst and Klatte, 1993:74). Crucial for the
success of this approach is the level and quality of the dialogue between the
different actors in the context of active partnership. For its part, the Commission
intends to promote and structure such a dialogue by providing a number of
formally institutionalized arenas or forums (Commission, 1992:82-83). One such
body will channel contacts between the various social-economic and
governmental partners by establishing a general advisory body on
environmental issues. This Advisory Council is supposed to function as a
platform for consultation and information exchange on environmental matters
between representatives of the diverse sectors and target groups from the
Member States.
In addition, two other discussion groups or advisory bodies at EU level
are intended to provide the framework for an effective dialogue of the kind
envisaged as part of a strategy of shared responsibility or partnership: an
Implementation Network and a Policy Review Group. The Implementation
Network will be made up of representatives from the national and community
authorities charged with the practical application of the Community
environmental regulations. It is supposed to provide a vehicle for the exchange
of practical experience in enforcing these programs at the national level. The
Policy Review Group is made up of representatives from the Member States at
the level of Director General, and is supposed to facilitate coordination between
the national policies of the 12 members and the policy of the Community.
THE FIFTH ACTION PROGRAM AND REGULATORY CHANGE IN THE
MEMBER STATES
As we have already observed above, the strategic line laid out in the Fifth
Action Plan builds on developments already underway in a number of Member
States. In these countries too the nature of public intervention in the economy is
undergoing significant change through which the regulatory relationship
between government and economic actors is redefined. A brief look at what has
been happening in this regard in some countries of Western Europe may throw
a bit of light on the institutional challenge that East European countries are now
facing in responding to both domestic and external demands for an
environmentally sound path of economic development. Such an overview
should also suggest the kinds of changes that must occur at the national level if
a given country is to be able to participate in the policy dialogue between
member states and the Community as well as to be in a position to implement
the environmental strategy of the EU.
A good place to begin this overview is the following observation:
Deregulation in Western European countries has not meant the abolition of, or
even a fundamental alteration in the basic set of, regulatory constraints on
economic activity through which the country's commitment to environmental
quality has been defined. Nor has it brought about any significant changes in
the mechanisms that hold the existing system of environmental regulation in
place. The underlying regulatory impulse carrying these environmental policy
measures remains operative and, therefore, continues to legitimate and give
direction to regulatory intervention 'shaping' market behavior in an
environmentally friendly manner (4).
For example, the deregulation program in the Netherlands has resulted
in a restructuring of regulatory space by creating the preconditions for (a
particular kind of) self-regulation (as an integral part of larger system of
government 'regulation' of environmentally-relevant activities). What we see in
this policy area is a redefinition of the traditional regulatory relationship between
government and the economy to create something that could be called
'cooperative self-regulation'. This involves, on one hand, the freeing up of
certain kinds of restraints so as to expose economic actors to the discipline of
market; and on the other hand, ‘creating’ a market for environmental quality to
which these actors can respond when making product and investment
decisions.
Thus, in the last analysis, regulatory reform has been designed to
provide increasing leeway for economic actors (‘deregulation’) in order to
improve their ability to respond to market signals and developments while at the
same time ensuring that they will take responsibility for the development of
pollution prevention strategies within the parameters set by the government's
environmental policy objectives (‘re-regulation’). Such a system of cooperative
self-regulation not only provides economic actors with substantial leeway in
deciding themselves how they will meet these quality objectives; it also
guarantees them an active role in co-determining what the general policy goals
will mean for particular industrial branches and, ultimately, the individual firms.
Both policy making and more specific rule making become processes of joint
decision making based on extensive consultation and bargaining between
government and the affected target groups of governmental intervention.
In these countries, therefore, the renegotiations of the agreements
governing the relations between government and economic actors has then
resulted in the restructuring of regulatory space around a point of equilibrium
between concern for environmental quality on the part of economic actors and
improved economic competitiveness of firms as a result of increased
responsiveness to market forces. Both in response to political pressures from
voters and action groups -forces at work in the traditional political market- and
as a result of direct consultation and bargaining between government and
representatives of economic sector(s) a regulatory framework has been created
that in turn generates the ‘market’ forces that are to be relied upon to discipline
the decision calculations of individual economic actors.
In order to understand how government intervention has worked to
create such a regulated market for environmental quality, the following points
should be kept in mind. At the ideological or programmatic level deregulation
has been carried out by the call to unshackle business from 'bureaucratic
regulations' and free it to respond to market forces. To the extent that society
wishes to promote certain collective environmental quality objectives, it should
be left to the firms themselves to decide in what ways their activities can be
brought into conformity with these objectives by allowing them to respond to the
same kinds of market considerations that guide their decisions on investment
and production. However, there is an important difference between deregulation
in the area of economic regulation and deregulation with regard to social
regulation. It is difficult to imagine what would it mean to determine
environmental quality decisions on the basis of the free play of 'market forces'.
The original problem giving rise to government intervention in the first place was
-and remains- that the market alone can not deal adequately with the problem
of the negative externalities of production which we experience as pollution.
Consequently, there are no market forces to rely on or to return to, once
regulations have been lifted, to promote the politically defined objectives of
socially acceptable environmental conditions.
On the other hand, as we have seen, deregulation is less about leaving
environmental quality at the mercy of free market forces and more about the
relation between the instruments to be used in pursuing these objectives and
the impact of these policy constraints on the ability of the affected firm to act
efficiently in the market place. Government intervention in private decision
making to correct shortcomings of the market is not to be abolished by
deregulation. Public authority is still to be used to influence economic behavior
in an environmentally 'friendly' direction. What is to be changed, within these
continuing policy parameters, is the mix of instruments through which these
behaviors are to be affected. Both by rationalizing the instrumentalities of direct
regulation and by making greater use of economic incentives as well as by
institutionalizing self-responsibility into the daily operations of the firm
('self-regulation'), more leeway is to be given to the firm to select its own
response to the constraints of environmental regulation in making its
firm-specific market calculations. By simultaneously retaining the objectives of
environmental regulation and increasing the firm's ability to adapt to the market,
it is assumed that the goals of economic development and a socially-efficient
environmental protection can be achieved together.
All well and good, as long as we keep in mind that government regulation
continues to be the basis on which the effectiveness of these alternative
instruments of environmental policy depends. Consequently, if 'care of the
environment' is to become 'good business' (practice), there will have to be some
kind of ‘market’ (economic bottom-line) conditions or incentives to stimulate and
carry this commitment. It would, clearly, be unrealistic to expect industrial
managers to take actions that undermine or are at odds with the
well-understood economic interests of their firm. Their commitment to
environmental responsibility needs to be 'carried' by its consistency with market
logic. At the same time, however, if the fundamental 'economic' cause of
environmental pollution is the failure of the market (under 'normal conditions') to
provide the signals that would force economic decision makers to internalize all
the relevant costs of production/ consumption, then these 'signals' (prices) have
to be introduced by government (external) action.
In this important sense, then, it is the regulatory activity of government (in
response to politically articulated will of the community) that creates the 'market'
situation in terms of which firms calculate the costs/benefits ratios of responses
to economic incentives for environmentally sound behavior or to the
attractiveness of governmental initiatives on pollution prevention. While
industrial managers may indeed be moved by notions of moral responsibility
and personal feelings regarding environmental quality, they will, in the last
analysis, act on the basis of economic rationality. If pollution prevention is to
pay (i.e. be in the long term economic interest of firms in the broadest sense,
not just in terms of 'short-term, immediate profit'), government policy must help
structure the market so that it provides appropriate signals for calculating these
pay-offs.
Cooperative self-regulation within such a regulated market for
environmental quality has also led to the enlargement of the community of
relevant actors involved both in negotiating the regulatory agreements and in
the functioning of the markets these measures create. A number of actors in
addition to national government participate in the translation of general
objectives into operative goals and procedures. These include representatives
from sub-national governmental authorities, the target groups themselves, and
other interested groups in society. Once in place, the market creates both new
opportunities and risks which, in turn, mobilize new and old actors. For
example, legislation defining the legal liability of firms for environmental
pollution affects the market for liability insurance. This then leads insurance
companies to evaluate a particular company's risk, and thus the premium it
must pay, in terms of the in-house capacity of the firm to manage its
environmental affairs effectively. Likewise, the loan and investment policies of
financial institutions, including banks and financial markets, can be geared to
the perceived 'greenness' of the firm in question. And of course, government
programs regarding product information and labelling reinforce the position of
consumers 'demanding' environmentally friendly products. In this way, then,
private market actors perform important functions within the overall system of
public regulation.
These, then, are some of the ways in which government policy creates
the foundation on which this particular social market economy is based and also
generates the incentives (both positive and negative) which ensure that
economic actors will remain sensitive to the market forces so created. This
combination of market incentives and regulatory constraints provides the
material basis for a system of self-regulation that is not just a question of good
will and admirable intentions. Co-operative self-regulation requires the discipline
of both a publicly-structured market and the ultimate threat of the regulatory
stick to keep things honest.
CONCLUSION: THE INSTITUTIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE OF EFFECTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
The emerging strategy of environmental regulation in Western Europe
and the EU is part of the process of redefining the relations between society
and its governmental authorities and the working out of a new division of labor
and pattern of collaboration between them. Students of alternative regulatory
schemes for promoting new environmental protection strategies stress that
efforts to prevent pollution will need to become a joint responsibility -in an
important sense, a co-produced result. The character of the regulatory relation
between business and government will need to shift from confrontation to
collaboration. At the heart of their vision is the belief that socially responsible
self-interest can be mobilized in support of long-term adjustments towards
pollution prevention. Supporting this faith is the already visible growing
awareness on the part of some large corporations that continued corporate
existence depends on the environmental performance of the firms and
enterprise and the continued support of public and government.
This paper has attempted to make two general points, intended to qualify
the enthusiasm for privatization and deregulation as the primary tools for
transforming Central European economic systems into functioning market
economies. First, we have argued that all market economies are in a
fundamental sense regulated economies. Consequently, Central and East
European countries do not really have the choice of a completely deregulated
and privatized market economy. The transformation of their economies will also
require that they confront the need to integrate economic development and
environmental quality. They, too, will be forced to 'regulate' their market
economy on the basis of some kind of commitment -enforced or freely chosen-
to sustainable development through the ecological modernization of the
economy. In this important sense, then, is not a question of regulation or no
regulation but rather one of finding the appropriate kinds of governmental
interventions -intended to shape and steer economic activity in socially
desirable (as defined through the political process) ways. This will mean that
traditional forms of direct intervention will be replaced or supplemented by
various modes of more indirect guidance. And this in turn means replacing the
'hard' instruments of direct regulation with the 'soft' intervention modes of
indirect and self-regulation. In any case it is important to keep in mind the need
for various governmental initiatives -jointly conceived with target groups- to
stimulate and encourage, but also to ‘keep socially honest’ the market-oriented
decision making of economic actors.
Given the external and, in the long run, internal (domestic) pressure for
sustainable development, the socially regulated market economy will have as
one important limiting factor (upon the 'free play of market forces') the
commitment to strategy of ecological modernization as a central element of its
policy for environmental quality. In Western countries, this commitment has
involved a reordering of regulatory space in a search for a balance between
market forces and government regulation of a new type. By creating the kind of
a regulated market described above, the objectives of sustainable development
are to be achieved by introducing considerations of environmental quality and
care as parameters for the decisions of economic actors.
Secondly, a market is not just the sum total of ‘freely‘ deciding producers
and equally autonomous consumers seeking the best bargain; markets of all
kinds require the creation of a variety of institutions to carry the activities. The
transformation of an economic system requires, therefore, not only the
regulatory underpinnings supplied by governmental policy; it also means that
the necessary organizational infra-structure must be provided, by either
establishing new institutions or adapting old ones to the various functions that
must be performed if a market is to operate efficiently. It is clear, for example,
that if a central element of cooperative self-regulation involves consultation and
bargaining between government and target groups, then there must be
intermediary organization to represents those segments of society. A strategy of
ecological modernization based on cooperative self-regulation requires a wide
range of organizational actors, within both government and society. In this
sense a regulated market for environmental quality also rests upon the
associational life of society as a whole.
There are at least three levels of institutional adaptation to market
economies which should be distinguished in this connection. First of all, and
most prominent in discussions of these problems, there is the need to create
the conditions for a new macro-system based on relatively free play of market
forces; this is the main focus for deregulation and privatization measures. In the
second place, at an intermediate or meso level, an associational infrastructure
must be created, either by adapting existing social and economic organizations
or by creating new ones to perform various functions required by a capitalist
economy. This will include redefining the working relation between government
and the different economic actors. And, thirdly, the development of such a
market system will require adjustments on the part of managers of industrial
firms since managing a firm in a market situation is different from performing the
same tasks in a planned economy in which the disciplining effects of market
exchanges are absent. The same holds true for government officials whose job
it has been to 'regulate' this economic activity in one way or another. The nature
of the regulatory role of the state, the instruments employed and the
relationships between regulatory agencies and their target groups will need to
be adapted to the requirements of the institutional context of the particular
market economy. These kinds of adjustments in the role conceptions and
management skills of both public and private actors are important preconditions
for the transition to an effectively working market order.
What this all means is that the creation of a market economy committed
to ecological modernization requires more than just the transfer of ownership of
assets to private hands and the discarding of regulations that restrict the
decision making freedom of market-oriented actors. The challenge faced in
economic change in Central Europe goes beyond the privatization and
deregulation of what has been inherited. If all markets are organized or, in an
important sense, publicly regulated, then the preconditions for the transition
from centrally planned economies to some form of market economy also include
the organizational underpinnings on which the effective functioning of such an
economic system ultimately depends.
And this is perhaps the greatest challenge faced by the countries of
Central Europe in transforming their economies: creating the institutional
capacities required to put into place and to operate the kind of system of
socially responsible self-regulation that is an integral part of a market for
sustainable development. This new kind of regulatory capacity (in the service of
preventive environmental policy) places especially great demands on the
capabilities of sub-national governmental authorities. It will also require new
habits of mind and management skills at the level of the individual firms.
Moreover, both government and industry will need the assistance of a number
of 'supporting' actors in redefining the appropriate relationships between the
private and the public in the new economy.
An analysis of this transformation process focuses attention on the role
that government must play in defining the regulatory structure of the new
economic system. It also makes us aware of the way in which this restructuring
of regulatory space also mobilizes a variety of actors and provides incentives to
tie their material interests to the promotion of environmental quality objectives.
But such an analysis also needs to examine the way in which the need
continually to redress the balance between economic development and
environmental protection generates a political process through which actors and
interest compete in the political market place to define the conditions under
which economic activity will be carried out.
NOTES
This paper was originally presented at a conference on “The Transition of the Slovak Economy
and the Environment” held in October 1993 in the High Tatras, Slovakia. A more extended
treatment of the general argument of a “regulated market for environmental quality” can be
found in “The Political Economy of Ecological Modernization. Creating a Regulated Market for
Environmental Quality” which is to appear in M. Moran and T. Prosser, (eds.): Privatisation and
Regulatory Change. Open University Press.
(1) For a handy overview of the development of Community environmental policy, see
Hildebrand (1992).
(2) The following discussion of the concept of ecological modernization and the place it has
come to occupy in the environmental policy strategy of the European Union draws, as the
references indicate, heavily of the work of Albert Weale.
(3) This general point is also made by Weale (1992:78-79).
(4) For an overview of developments related to the "deregulation" of environmental policy in The
Netherlands, see Hanf (1989).
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